Opening Plenary - Main Room (Mon, 14:00)
This is a draft agenda: changes are still being made.
What if someone could disrupt your RPKI configuration or take over your RIPE Database objects? All because you clicked a single link to a RIPE NCC website?
I've spent the past year putting marquee tags and XSS injection payloads into every protocol field I control: TLS certificate SANs, DNS NSID and version.bind responses, HTTP Server headers, RIPE Database objects, wifi SSIDs, and much more. Many tools that display these fields treat them as safe data. And some of these share a trust boundary …
The ASPA technology for authorizing BGP AS Paths has been in the draft state for a long time and it's almost done. This talk reminds the audience about the ASPA technology and sheds some light on the implementation and deployment questions which have repeatedly impeded the way forward for this set of drafts.