Detecting and Characterizing DDoS Scrubbing from Global BGP Routing:​ Insights from Five Leading Scrubbers​

Many scrubbers use the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to route Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) traffic to their infrastructure, allowing them to drop the DDoS traffic and forward legitimate traffic to the Autonomous Systems (ASes) the scrubber protects. Despite their importance, the prevalence and operational behaviors of BGP-based DDoS scrubbing services remain poorly understood, such as the extent to which protected ASes always have a scrubber on their path or activate a scrubber on-demand when an attack occurs. We bridge this gap by detecting scrubbing activations and deactivations in public BGP data, where they manifest themselves as a scrubber dynamically appearing as the first upstream of an origin AS or as an origin AS for a particular prefix. We use 30 days of BGP data from the RIS route collectors, focusing on the global top five scrubbing providers, such as Cloudflare and Akamai. We also characterize their behavior, including protection modes, on-demand mitigation strategies, and RPKI/IRR practices. We find that prefixes that always use a scrubber are dominant compared to those that activate a scrubber on-demand. We also observe that 48% of the prefixes that scrubbers temporarily originate during an attack are not covered by valid RPKI ROAs (12.5% Invalid and 35.5% Notfound), which highlights a potential operational gap in current scrubbing practices regarding routing security. These insights are conservative because we only consider public BGP data and AS path changes that are most likely to be scrubbing events (e.g., those observed by two or more route collector peers). We believe our work is useful for security researchers and policymakers, for instance, to better understand DDoS protection levels of ASes in a particular country or region.